Halakhic category | How fetus is seen | Terminology |
חבלת האם (עובר ירך אמו)(מהרי”ט א:צ”ז, צ”ט) | Woman’s body (not independent existence) | הפסקת הריון (צ”א) |
זרע לבטלה (חו”י ס’ ל”א; שו”ת יעב”ץ א:מ”ג) | Potential Life | הפסקת הריון (צ”א) |
“חבלה” | Quasi Life | הפלת עוברין (צ”א) |
(קרוב ל) רציחה (אג”מ חו”מ ב:ס”ט) | (Almost) Life | רציחת עוברין (אג”מ) |
Stages of Development | Potential Justification |
0-40 days (מיא בעלמא – יבמות (סט:)) | Lower threshold |
40 days | Fetus’ suffering, non-viability |
3 months הוכר הולד (סוטה כ ע”ב) 3rd trimester (צ”א, “סברת הכרס”) | Mother’s health (physical, emotional) חו”י, יעב”ץ, מהרי”ט, ציץ אליעזר ט’:נ”א פרק ג’, י”ג:ק”א) |
In birth process (נעקר הולד, ערכין (ו.)) | Mother’s life (גמ’, אג”מ חו”מ ב:ס”ט) |
שמות פרק כא (כב) וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן עָנוֹשׁ יֵעָנֵשׁ כַּאֲשֶׁר יָשִׁית עָלָיו בַּעַל הָאִשָּׁה וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים: (כג) וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ: | 22. If men quarrel, and hurt a pregnant woman, so that her fruit depart from her, and there is no ason; he shall be surely punished, according to what the woman’s husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. 23. And if there be an a son, then you shall give life for life |
2. Septuagint, Shemot 21:22-23 (NETS translation)
Now if two men fight and strike a pregnant woman and her child comes forth not fully formed, he shall be punished with a fine. According as the husband of the woman might impose, he shall pay with judicial assessment. But if it is fully formed, he shall pay life for life. |
3. Philo, Special Laws III
(108) But if any one has a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike her a blow on her belly, and she miscarries, if the child which was conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall be punished by a fine… But if the child which was conceived had assumed a distinct Shape in all its parts, having received all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall die; (109) for such a creature as that is a man…requiring nothing more than to be released and sent out into the world. |
4. Rashi on Shemot 21
(22) There is no further harm – to the woman. He shall pay – the judges assess him to pay for the value of the fetus. (23) And if any further harm follows – to the woman. |
5. Mishnah Niddah, 4:3
משנה מסכת נדה פרק ה משנה ג’ תנוק בן יום אחד…ונוחל ומנחיל וההורגו חייב והרי הוא לאביו ולאמו ולכל קרוביו כחתן שלם | A one day old baby boy… inherits and transmits; one who kills him is guilty of murder, and he counts to his father, to his mother and to all his relatives as a fully grown man |
6. Bavli Sanhedrin 91b
תלמוד בבלי מסכת סנהדרין צא: ואמר לו אנטונינוס לרבי: נשמה מאימתי ניתנה באדם, משעת פקידה או משעת יצירה? – אמר לו: משעת יצירה. – אמר לו: אפשר חתיכה של בשר עומדת שלשה ימים בלא מלח ואינה מסרחת? אלא, משעת פקידה. אמר רבי: דבר זה למדני אנטונינוס, ומקרא מסייעו, שנאמר +איוב י’+ ופקדתך שמרה רוחי. | Antoninus also said to Rabbi, ‘When is the soul placed in man; as soon as it is decreed [that the sperm shall be male or female, etc.], or when [the embryo] is actually formed?’ He replied, ‘From the moment of formation.’ He objected: ‘Can a piece of meat be unsalted for three days without becoming putrid? But it must be from the moment that [God] decrees [its destiny].’ Rabbi said: This thing Antoninus taught me, and Scripture supports him, for it is written, And thy decree hath preserved my spirit [i.e., my soul]. |
General statement regarding the valuing of potential life
7. Bavli Yevamot 63b
תלמוד בבלי יבמות (סג:) תניא, רבי אליעזר אומר: כל מי שאין עוסק בפריה ורביה – כאילו שופך דמים, שנאמר: +בראשית ט’+ שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך, וכתיב בתריה: ואתם פרו ורבו. רבי יעקב אומר: כאילו ממעט הדמות, שנאמר: +בראשית ט’+ כי בצלם אלהים עשה את האדם, וכתיב בתריה: ואתם פרו וגו’. בן עזאי אומר: כאילו שופך דמים וממעט הדמות, שנאמר: ואתם פרו ורבו. | It was taught: R. Eliezer stated, ‘He who does not engage in propagation of the race is as though he sheds blood; for it is said, ‘Whoso shedds man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed’ (Bereishit 9:6), and this is immediately followed by the text, ‘And you, be ye fruitful and multiply’ (Bereishit 9:7). R. Yacob said: As though he has diminished the Divine Image; since it is said, For in the image of God made (b’tzelem elokim) he man’ (Bereishit 9:6), and this is immediately followed by, And you, be ye fruitful etc. Ben ‘Azzai said: As though he sheds blood and diminishes the Divine Image; since it is said, ‘And you, be ye fruitful and multiply’. |
Desecrating Shabbat to save the life of a fetus
תלמוד בבלי מסכת ערכין ז. א”ר נחמן אמר שמואל: האשה שישבה על המשבר ומתה בשבת, מביאין סכין ומקרעים את כריסה ומוציאין את הוולד… מהו דתימא: התם הוא דהוה ליה חזקה דחיותא, אבל הכא דלא הוה ליה חזקה דחיותא מעיקרא אימא לא, קמ”ל. | R. Nahman said in the name of Shmuel: If a woman who has been sitting on a birthstool died on Shabbat, one may bring a knife and cut her womb open to take out the child…You might have said: There [permission was given] because [the person in question] had at least presumption of having been alive, but here where it [the embryo] did not have such original presumption of life, one might say no [desecration of Shabbat shall be permitted], therefore we are informed [that it is]. |
Aborting to save the mother’s life
10. Mishna Ohalot, 7:6
משנה מסכת אהלות פרק ז:ו’ האשה שהיא מקשה לילד מחתכין את הולד במעיה ומוציאין אותו אברים אברים מפני שחייה קודמין לחייו יצא רובו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש: | If a woman is in hard travail, one cuts up the child in her womb and brings it forth member by member, because her life comes before that of [the child]. But if the greater part has proceeded forth, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person’s life for that of another. |
תלמוד בבלי מסכת סנהדרין אמר רב הונא: קטן הרודף ניתן להצילו בנפשו. ..איתיביה רב חסדא לרב הונא: יצא ראשו-אין נוגעין בו לפי שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש. ואמאי? רודף הוא! שאני התם דמשמיא רדפי ליה. | Rav Huna said, “A minor who is a rodef (pursuer) may be killed to save the pursued’…Rav Hisda challenged Rav Huna, If his head has come out, we don’t touch him, since we don’t set aside one life for another. But, why? He is a rodef! It is different in that case, since she is pursued by Heaven. |
Aborting for other purposes – a pregnant woman condemned to death
12. Bavli Arakhin 7a
תלמוד בבלי מסכת ערכין ז מתני’. האשה שיצאה ליהרג – אין ממתינין לה עד שתלד. האשה שישבה על המשבר – ממתינין לה עד שתלד… גמ’. פשיטא, גופה היא! איצטריך, ס”ד אמינא: הואיל וכתיב +שמות כא+ כאשר ישית עליו בעל האשה, ממונא דבעל הוא ולא ליפסדיה מיניה, קמ”ל.ואימא ה”נ! אמר רבי אבהו אמר רבי יוחנן, אמר קרא: +דברים כב+ ומתו גם שניהם, לרבות את הוולד. .
| MISHNAH. If a woman is about to be executed, one does not wait for her until she gives birth: but if she had already sat on the birthstool, one waits for her until she gives birth… GEMARA. But that is self-evident, for it is her body! — It is necessary to teach it, for one might have assumed since Scripture says: “According as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him,” that it [the unborn child] is the husband’s property, of which he should not be deprived, therefore we are informed [that it is not so]. But perhaps [the former point of view] may indeed [be the law]? — Said R. Abbuha in the name of R. Yohanan: Scripture says: “They shall die, also both of them,” that includes the child… “But if she had already sat on the birthstool…” What is the reason? — As soon as it moves [from its place in the womb] it is another body. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: If a woman is about to be executed one strikes her against her womb so that the child may die first, to avoid her being disgraced… |
A limb of the mother?
13. Bavli Baba Kama 78b
מתלמוד בבלי, בבא קמא עח: עובר ירך אמו | The fetus is the thigh of its mother |
14. Rambam, Laws of Injury, 5:1
רמב”ם הלכות חובל ומזיק ה: א’ אסור לאדם לחבול בין בעצמו בין בחבירו | It is forbidden for a person to inflict bodily harm, whether unto himself or unto others. |
Before 40 days?
תלמוד בבלי, נדה (ל.) מתני’. המפלת ליום מ’ – אינה חוששת לולד, ליום מ”א – תשב לזכר ולנקבה ולנדה… | Mishna. If a woman miscarries on day 40 (from conception) – she need not concern herself with the impurity of childbirth (lit., with a child). On day 41 – she must observe [the impure days] for a male child, a female child, and for being a niddah. |
16. Bavli Yevamot (69b)
תלמוד בבלי, יבמות סט: והתניא: בת כהן שנישאת לישראל ומת – טובלת ואוכלת בתרומה לערב! אמר רב חסדא: טובלת ואוכלת עד ארבעים, דאי לא מיעברא – הא לא מיעברא, ואי מיעברא – עד ארבעים מיא בעלמא היא. | But did we not teach: If the daughter of a Kohen marries an Israelite he dies, she can immerse and eat trumah that evening! Said Rav Hisda: She can immerse and eat until 40 days, for if she is not pregnant – she is not pregnant! And if she is pregnant – until 40 days, it (the fetus) is mere water! |
17. Tosafot, Hullin (33a), s.v. Echad
תוספות חולין דף לג עמוד א ד”ה אחד משמע דטעמא משום דליכא מידי דלישראל שרי ולעובד כוכבים אסור… ואע”ג דבן נח נהרג על העוברים כדאמר התם וישראל אינו נהרג נהי דפטור מ”מ לא שרי | This Gemara implies that there is nothing that is permissible to a Jew that is forbidden to a non-Jew… Although a Noahide is executed for killing a fetus, and a Jew is not executed, although he is exempt, nevertheless it is not permissible to do so. |
18. Tosafot, Niddah (44a), s.v., Iyhu
תוס’ נדה (מד.) ד”ה איהו וא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי’ מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת שמביאין סכין דרך ר”ה לקרוע האם כדמוכח בפ’ קמא דערכין (דף ז:) וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו דהא גוסס בידי אדם ההורגו פטור… ומחללין את השבת עליו… | Now, were you to ask – if it is permissible to kill a fetus in the mother’s womb [even after the mother has died], and it is not considered to just be placed in a box, then why can we violate Shabbat for him? For we bring a knife by way of the public domain to surgically remove him from the mother, as it is stated in Arakhin (7a). One can say: that nevertheless, for the sake of saving a life, we violate Shabbat even though it is permissible to kill him. For behold for a gosses by human hands, one who kills him is exempt… and we can nevertheless violate Shabbat to save his life… |
19. Ramban, Torat Ha’Adam Sha’ar Ha’Mechush – Inyan Sakanah
תורת האדם שער המיחוש – ענין הסכנה ואע”ג דתנן (אהלות פ”ז) האשה המקשה לילד מביאין סכין ומחתכין אותו אבר אבר יצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש, דאלמא מעיקרא לית ביה משום הצלת נפשות, ותנן נמי (נדה מ”ד א’) גבי תינוק בן יום אחד וההורגו חייב, ודוקא בן יום אחד אבל עובר לא, וקרא נמי כתיב דמשלם דמי ולדות, אפילו הכי לענין שמירת מצות מחללין עליה, אמרה תורה חלל עליו שבת אחת שמא ישמור שבתות הרבה. הלכך אפי’ בהצלת עובר פחות מבן ארבעים יום שאין לו חיות כלל מחללין עליו כדעת בעל הלכות. ואיכא דסבירא ליה שאין מחללין משום נפלים… | The Mishna in Ohalot however states (7:6), ‘If a woman is in hard travail, one cuts up the child in her womb and brings it forth member by member, because her life comes before that of [the child]. But if the greater part has proceeded forth, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person’s life for that of another’. Now this implies that beforehand [before birth] there is no concept of ‘saving of a life’. Similarly the Mishna states (Niddah 44a) that if a person murders a one day old child he is liable the death penalty – that is, only a one day old child, not a fetus – and the verse also states that one pays monetary compensation for [causing a miscarriage] of a fetus. Nevertheless, regarding the issue of mitzvah observance, we can violate Shabbat for a fetus. The Torah says: violate one Shabbat for him, for perhaps he might keep many Shabbats. Therefore, even to save a fetus less than 40 days old, which has no [current] viability, we would desecrate Shabbat according to Hilkhot Gedolot. There are those who are of the opinion that we do not violate Shabbat for fetuses… |
20. Rambam, Laws of Murder, 1:9
רמב”ם רוצח ושמירת הנפש א:ט הרי זו מצות לא תעשה שלא לחוס על נפש הרודף. לפיכך הורו חכמים שהעוברה שהיא מקשה לילד מותר לחתוך העובר במיעיה בין בסם בין ביד מפני שהוא כרודף אחריה להורגה, ואם משהוציא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש וזהו טבעו של עולם | Behold it is a negative prohibition to have mercy on the pursuer. Therefore, the Sages have ruled if there is a pregnant woman who is in travail in childbirth, that it is permissible to dismember the fetus in her womb, whether by medicinal means or whether surgically, because it is as if he is pursuing her life. However, once the fetus’ head has emerged, one may not lay a hand on it (to abort it), because one cannot override one life to save another, and this is the way of the world. |
21. Tosafot, Niddah (44a), s.v. Iyhu
תוספות נדה דף מד עמוד א ד”ה איהו וא”ת אם תמצי לומר דמותר להורגו בבטן אפי’ מתה אמו ולא הוי כמונח בקופסא אמאי מחללין עליו את השבת… וי”ל דמכל מקום משום פקוח נפש מחללין עליו את השבת אף ע”ג דמותר להרגו… | According to the possibility that it is permitted to kill it (the fetus) in the womb, even if the mother has already died, and it is not considered to be merely residing in a box, then we can ask – why should it be permissible to violate the Shabbat for its sake? And one can answer that nevertheless for the sake of preserving a life one can violate the Shabbat even though it is permissible to kill it… |
Rabbi Joseph ben Moses Trani (Maharit), the son of Mabit (q.v.), was born in Safed in 1568, and died in Constantinople in 1639.
שו”ת מהרי”ט חלק א סימן צז שאלה עובר רך /ירך/ אמו… | Question. Regarding a fetus which is considered the thigh of its mother… In the second chapter of Hullin… Tosafot wrote that while one is exempt from killing a fetus, it is nevertheless not permitted to do so… [The reason is] that it is forbidden on the basis of bodily injury. The Mishna in chapter 7 of Ohalot states… And it is only because the mother’s life takes precedence that we can abort it, but were it not that there was a risk to her life, there is a matter of concern regarding [taking] the life of a fetus. So how then can we say in Arakhin that we would kill the fetus directly (lit., with our hands) because of concern of disfigurement of the mother? And an additional question, for in that very sugya in Arakhin, it quotes the case of the women who sits on the birthing stool on Shabbat… From this it is clear that it is considered a risk of life and it overrides Shabbat…. And Tosafot also wrote the a non-Jew is liable for killing a fetus, and a Jew is exempt, but although he is exempt, it is not permissible. We see that there is a prohibition in this matter. And we can answer – that the case of being taken out to be executed is different, since the fetus will be executed together with the mother, since a fetus is a thigh of the mother… |
23. Responsa of Maharit, 1:99
שו”ת מהרי”ט, א:צט ומדפריך פשיטא משמע דמחמת איבוד נפשות אין נדנוד כלל… הילכך בישראלית מפני צורך אמו נראה שמותר להתעסק עמהם שתפילנה כיון דרפואת אמו היא | And from the fact that the Gemara (Arakhin 7a) says, “It is obvious!” [that we can abort the fetus of the woman who is condemned], it implies that as far as taking a [fetal] life is concerned, there is not the slightest issue of concern… Therefore, regarding a Jewish woman, in a case of the mother’s need, it would appear that it is permissible to assist them to have an abortion, since it is for the sake of the mother’s health.
|
24. Responsa of Havot Yair, 31
Rabbi Yair Chaim ben Moses Samson Bachrach, Germany, 1638-1702.
ושו”ת חוות יאיר סימן לא ועל דבר שאלתך אשת איש שהרה לזנונים
| Regarding your question of a married woman who became pregnant through adultery… and the question is whether she is permit to swallow some medicine that will cause her to abort. And you wanted to know my opinion regarding this matter… And it seems that your question is whether in general there is a sin of destroying a life in this case. Now, it would be possible to make a number of distinctions, such as whether 40 days have passed – for before this time it is “mere water”, as is stated in Yevamot and Kriot – or whether three months have passed which is the time when the pregnancy is visible, or if she sensed in her womb the movement of the infant, which occurs a brief time after the 3 months, nevertheless it is not our interest to decide based on how we would be inclined to think or the “logic of the gut”, but only according to Torah law. The Mishnah in Niddah states that only one who murders a one day old child is liable for execution, but not for a fetus… Nevertheless, before the fetus has detached, it would seem that it is permitted to abort it according to everyone, based on the Talmud in Arakhin, where a condemned woman can be hit so that the fetus’ death will not lead to her disgrace… And you cannot ask from the fact that we violate Shabbat to save the life of a fetus… for perhaps that is really because of the life of the mother, for any danger to the fetus is a danger to the mother… And you cannot say [that if it is permitted,] why did the Gemara imply that were it not for the principle of it being part of her body [which is condemned to death] we would wait for the child to be born, how much more so not to cause it death. For it certainly is forbidden ab initio. For it is no better than a case of masturbation, which is considered to be a “slaughtering of children.” And masturbation is considered a grave offense, and the reason is because every drop of semen has the potential to create holy progeny. And one cannot say that the prohibition of masturbation is because of auto-eroticism… Thus even women are prohibited from wasting seed [and destroying potential life]… Therefore, based on what we have written, it would be completely permissible in your case according to Torah law, were it not for the widespread practice amongst us and amongst them [not to abort], because of a safeguard against fornicators and those who fornicate after them… Nonetheless, in Hullin 33, Tosafot wrote as a matter of obvious fact that “while one is exempt [who aborts], nevertheless it is not permissible to do so”… This is implicit in the Gemara’s discussion, that had it not been for the reason that “the fetus is her body,” [and can be executed with her], there would be a logic to wait to save the fetus, and how much more so should we not cause its death at the outset. The reason for this is that to do so is no better than those who “inflame themselves under every leafy tree and slaughter (or ‘squeeze out’ children” (Niddah 13a based on Isa. 57:5), and the Rabbis spoke in extreme terms regarding the prohibition to waste semen, and the reason is because it is possible that a holy life (lit., seed) will be created from every drop. One cannot say that the reason for all these problems is because of provoking the evil inclination, for if that were the case, there would be no need to bring a proof from the verses.. And this prohibition of wasting semen applies even to women (to destroy the man’s semen in their body), and is only permitted in three special cases of women… We see that it is also Rashi’s opinion that regarding other women (not the special cases), the problem is only regarding the man to waste his seed, and it is not a problem for the women, thus there is no inherent problem to destroy the semen after it has been “absorbed” (i.e., possibly caused conception). Nevertheless, just because we can make an argument does not mean that we can make a ruling tht is should be allowed for a woman (to destroy the semen in her body), and how much more so after the semen has been “absorbed”. Thus, one who assists in this is aiding those who are sinning… Thus, anyone who is involved in this act, or who causes it, I fear that he may be deserving a sin offering… Although we have made arguments, to actually act on it, we cannot permit. And no more needs to be said about this. Now, please, my brother, do not burden me any more with questions such as these, for it is only with difficulty that I answered you this time. |
25. Rabbi Jacob Emden, Responsa Shelat Yavetz, I 43
Rabbi Jacob ben Tzvi Emden was born in 1697 and died in 1776, in Germany.
שו”ת שאילת יעבץ חלק א סימן מג ששאלת אם יש איסור לקלקל עובר בבטן אמו שזינתה. בין פנויה בין אשת איש. תשובה בס’ חות יאיר (אחר סי’ ל”א) מצאתי שנשאל הרב בעל הס’ על אשת איש הרה לזנונים. ואחר המעשה נתחרטה כו’ אם רשאה לגמוע דבר מאבקת רוכל לשלשל זרע המקולל אשר בקרבה… כי נ”ל שיש מקום להקל כיון שניאפה זאת ודם בידיה. מעתה בת קטלא היא מדין תורה. אף שאין דמה מסור בידינו להורגה. מכל מקום חייבת מיתה בדין שמים…. אע”ג דממזר כשיצא לאויר העולם. דינו ככשר שחייבין על הריגתו. מיהת השתא דירך אמו הוא. ואילו היה דינה מסור בידינו. היינו ממיתים אותה ואת פרי בטנה… על כן היה נ”ל פשוט שאין איסור גם כן בהשחתתו. אע”פ שאימא קיימת…. ובמה שהתעסק הרב ז”ל בתשו’ הנז’ להראות פנים לאיסור. ללמדו מעון הוצאת ש”ז לבטלה. יש לדחות דאיכא למימר דלאו היינו טעמא. אלא משום דמערה לאשפה ומוסיף בכחות הטומאה ומכחיש בפמליא של מעלה, כידוע מטעם חכמי האמת בעלי הקבלה… אלא ודאי לא מיקרי לבטלה כי אם כששחת ארצה ומטעם הנז’… וא”כ בעובר כיון דלאו ולד הוא. וספק אם יבוא לכלל ולד גמור כנז’. עדיין הספק במקומו עומד. וגם בעובר כשר הי’ צד להקל לצורך גדול. כל כמה דלא עקר. אפי’ אינו משום פקוח נפש אמו. אלא להציל לה מרעתו. שגורם לה כאב גדול וצ”ע. אמנם דעת לנבון נקל שעכ”פ יש איסור לכתחלה בהשחתתו מפשטא דתלמודא אף שאינו חייב על העוברין. וכן להשחית זרע שנקלט במעי אשה אע”פ שעדיין לא נתעברה ממנו. ודאי אסור שלא לצורך, כדמוכח מדלא שרי לשמש במוך. אלא לג’ נשים דווקא. ואיברא לצורך אף להוציא זרע לבטלה להשחיתו על הארץ שרי, כדאשכחן לענין בדיקת הניקב בגובתא דש”ז דמותבינן ליה אבי פוקרי. ש”מ דאיסור חמור זה הותר מכללו אצל צורך מצוה. כמ”ש במ”א בס”ד ואין להאריך. | Question: Regarding what you asked – is there a violation to destroy a fetus in the womb of a mother who is pregnant due to fornication, both in the case of a single woman and the case of a married woman. Response: In the book Havot Yair (following responsum 31) I have found that the author was asked about a married woman who became pregnant due to adultery, and after the act she had regret, etc., if she is allowed to swallow some medicine that will cause her to abort (lit., destroy the corrupt seed within her)… Now it would seem to me that there is reason to be lenient since she has committed adultery and there is blood on her hands. Therefore, she is now deserving of death according to the Torah. Although her life is not in ur hands to execute her, nevertheless, by law of Heaven she is deserving of death… Although a mamzer once he is born has the status of a “kosher” person, for whom it would be murder to kill, nevertheless, now, that he is still a limb of his mother, and if her life were in our hands we would execute her with her unborn child… it is obvious to me that there is no prohibition in destroying it, even if his mother remains alive… Now, regarding the author’s attempt to demonstrate in that responsum that there was there was an element of violation based on the sin of wasting of seed. This can be rejected, for one can say that this (wasting potential life) is not the reason for the prohibition, but rather because one “spills into the dung heep” and gives power to the demonic powers and weakens the supernal forces, as is known from the masters of Kabbalah… One can thus see that it is not considered to be “for waste” except when it is wasted on the ground (as a result of masturbation), based on the reason given above… Thus, regarding a fetus, since it is not a life it is a doubt if it will ever become a full life, as discussed, the matter is still doubtful. Thus even for a “kosher” fetus (not the result of adultery) there would be reason to be lenient for a great need, until the point when it has “become uprooted” (childbirth has begun). Even when the mother’s life is not at risk, but it is just to save the fetus from the evil that will befall it, that it will cause significant pain to the mother. And this requires further investigation. Knowledge is easy to he who understands it, that there is nevertheless a prohibition at the outset to destroy a fetus based on the simple sense of the Talmud, although one is not liable for murder regarding fetuses. And similarly [it is prohibited] to destroy semen that has been absorbed into a woman’s body, although she has not yet conceived as a result. All of this is definitely forbidden without a reason, as is clear from the discussion that women who may not use a mokh, save for three special cases. In truth, however, for a (legitimate) purpose it is permissible, even to “waste seed” and to spill it on the ground, as we see in the case of the testing of the genitals (Yevamot 76a). From this we see that this serious prohibition is permitted in the case of the mitzvah need, as I have written elsewhere, and there is no need to write at more length. |
26. Tzitz Eliezer 9: 51 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg)
Rabbi Jacob ben Tzvi Emden was born in 1697 and died in 1776, in Germany.
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר חלק ט סימן נא – קונ’ רפואה במשפחה פרק ג סיכום היוצא לנו להלכה מכל האמור בשער זה. א’ בן נח נהרג על העוברין. ויש דעה שאינו נהרג. ב’ ישראל אינו נהרג על העוברין. ג’ כשיש צורך והדין נותן שמותר לסדר לאשה הפלה יש להעדיף לבצע זאת על ידי רופא ישראל. ד’ יש להחמיר בסידור הפלה לעכו”ם מלישראל באשר המה מצווין גם על העוברין ועוברים על לפ”ע כשאין אחרים בלעדו שמוכנים ג”כ לבצע זאת… וכמו כן כשיש מן הצורך לסדר הפלה לעכו”ם יש לחזר שיעשה זה רופא ישראל. ה’ יש סוברים שאף על פי שישראל אינו נהרג על העוברין מכל מקום יש עליו איסור תורה מעשות זאת. ו’ ויש סוברים שגם איסור תורה ליכא ויש רק איסור מדרבנן. ז’ וישנם גם הסוברים שגם מדרבנן האיסור שיש בזה הוא קלוש. ח’ ע”פ תורת הנסתר האיסור בהפלת עובר חמור עד מאד. ט’ כשנשקפת סכנה לאשה בהמשכת ההריון יש להתיר הפלת העובר בשופי. י’ גם כשמצב בריאותה של האשה רופף מאד ולשם רפואתה או השקטת מכאוביה הגדולים דרוש לבצע הפלת העובר, אע”פ שאין סכנה ממשית, גם כן יש מקום להתיר לעשות זאת, וכפי ראות עיני המורה המצב שלפניו. י”א כן יש להתיר כנ”ז כשהאשה מינקת. י”ב אשת איש שזנתה או נאנסה ונתעברה ואפילו מעכו”ם שאין הולד ממזר וחזרה בתשובה, מצדדים כמה מגדולי הפוס’ להתיר לסדר הפלה אי משום בזיונה ואי משום חלול השם ופגם ובזיון המשפחה [ואי משום נימוקים אחרים הנזכרים בפנים]. י”ג לסדר הפלה קודם שנמלאו ארבעים יום מהריונה וגם לרבות קודם ג’ חדשים מהריונה הוא קיל בהרבה מלסדר לאחר מיכן ויש על כן לצדד להתיר לסדר הפלה קודם שנמלאו לה כנ”ל והעובר איננו עוד בתנועה גם כשיש חשש מבוסס שהעובר שיולד יצא בעל מום ובעל יסורים. י”ד מאידך להמית הולד כשהאשה יושבת כבר על המשבר והולד כבר נעקר לצאת הוא חמור בהרבה מלפני שנעקר ואין להתיר בכגון זה כי אם במקום סכנה של ממש לאשה. ט”ו גם במקום שהדין נותן להתיר הפלה מכל מקום יש לקבל על כך גם הסכמת הבעל כי ממונו הוא. ט”ז כן יש לחזר לסדר ההפלה ע”י שתיית רפואה מעשיית מעשה בידים. י”ז אשה שחולה במחלה מסוכנת שעומדת למות ממנה וההריון שהרה בו אם תמשיך בו יקרב מיתתה והאשה מתחננת שלא לסדר לה הפלה ולא איכפת לה אם זה יקרב מימתה /מיתתה/ ובלבד שישאר אחריה זכר, יש מקום להתיר להיות בזה שב ואל תעשה. י”ח כל בני ישראל מוזהרים באזהרה חמורה לא לנהוג קלות ראש בהפסקת ההריון, ואחריות גדולה מוטלת בזה הן על השואל והן על הנשאל. מלבד מה שיש בזה משום גידור פרצת הפרוצות והזונים אחריהם שגם אומות העולם גדרו עצמם בזה ותיקנו תקנות ועונשים חמורים על העוברים והמסייעים, וישראל קדושים המה | Summary of the halakhot that emerge from the preceding section:
|
27. Tzitz Eliezer, 13:102 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg)
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר י”ג:ק”א יא סיון תשל”ה השאלה היא, אודות הפסקת הריון בגלל המחלה הנקראת תיי – סקס.. הטכניקה בה ניתן כיום לבצע בדיקות מעבדה אלה, אינה נותנת תוצאות לפני תום שלשה חדשי הריון. לזאת נפשו בשאלתו, אם: האם לראות במחלה זו אשר תוצאותה כה חמורות וכה וודאיות, מספיק חמור בכדי לאפשר הפסקת הריון גם אחרי שלשה חדשים, או האם התקופה הזו של שלשה חדשים היא אבסולוטית ואין שום סיבה פרט לסיבה של פקוח נפש ישיר באם, אשר מאפשר הפסקת הריון אחר ג’ חדשי עיבור, ע”כ. (ב) וזאת לדעת, כי בדבריהם של המהרי”ט והיעב”ץ לא נזכר כלל שישנו כאלו הפרש בזה בין תוך ג’ חדשים לבין לאחר ג’ חדשים, וההגבלה הסתמית בזה היא רק שיש חילוק בין עקר לצאת לבין לא עקר לצאת, ואדרבה היעב”ץ כותב בהדיא בלשון: כל כמה דלא עקר, ומינה דהא כל כמה דלא עקר אין חילוק באיזה חודש שהיא נמצאת… | 1975
|
28. Tzitz Eliezer, 14:102 (R. Eliezer Waldenberg)
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר י”ד:ק”א אודות בדיקת מי השפיר כדי לגלות מקרה של מונגולודיזם אצל העובר, ובהפסק הריון במקרים הנ”ל. י’ באדר ב’ תשל”ח. לכבוד הרב הגאון רבי אליעזר יהודה וולדינברג שליט”א. אב בית הדין הרבני, בירושלים…
תשובה. ב”ה, י”ז אדר”ב תשל”ח. ירושלים עיה”ק תובב”א. למכובדי פרופ’ ד”ר דוד מ’ מאיר נ”י. המנהל הכללי של ביה”ח שערי צדק בירושלים. שלום וישע רב. והנני בכבוד רב ובברכה מרובה אליעזר יהודא וולדינברג. | Regarding checking the amniotic fluid to detect if the fetus has Mongoloidism (Down’s syndrome), and terminating a pregnancy under such circumstances. March 19, 1978To his honor, haRav haGaon, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, shlita, head of the Rabbinical Court, Jerusalem… Among those who give birth over the age of 37, the frequency of such cases is approximately 1%, and amongst those who give birth over the age of 40, the frequency of occurrence is approximately 2%. The Ministry of Health will implement an amniocentesis screening program to be done at a time that will enable the detection of the embryos with this syndrome and the decision to terminate the pregnancy. This syndrome cannot be detected within the first three months of pregnancy. There is thus in this case a halakhic question similar to the one regarding pregnancy with a child who has Tay-Sachs disease. As is known to his honor, a child who suffers from Down’s syndrome is completely different from one who suffers from Tay-Sachs. Down’s syndrome is a very undesirable disease accompanied by physical changes and mental retardation that sometimes requires institutional care and is linked to a shortened life expectancy. But, one should not compare a child with this disease to a child with Tay-Sachs who will surely die. It seems to me that the permission to terminate the pregnancy in a case of Tay-Sachs is based mainly on how such a case will impact the mental state of the parents, especially the mother, and it is for this reason that the rabbi (you) ruled that it is possible to terminate the pregnancy up through the seventh month of pregnancy. The harsh impact of a case of Tay-Sachs on the parents is clear and straightforward. On the other hand, although it is possible that Down’s syndrome will have such a negative effect, at the same time I am familiar with families who love their children who suffer from Down’s syndrome. I am sure that I will soon be faced with inquiries from mothers of thirty-seven to forty years who will have two concerns: (a) Is it permissible to perform amniocentesis in order to discover cases of Down’s syndrome? (b) Requests for termination of pregnancy in such cases.Response. March 26, 1978. Jerusalem. To the honorable Prof. Dr. M. Meir, the executive director of Shaarei Tzedek Hospital in Jerusalem. … Let us turn to second and main problem, if it is permissible to terminate pregnancy in the event that the examination shows 100% (as I was told in a verbal conversation) that the fetus suffers from Down’s syndrome, given that we are talking about doing this after three months of pregnancy. Now, as his honor himself senses and emphasizes in his letter, one cannot compare the case of a child with this disease to a child with Tay-Sachs who will definitely die. Similarly, a child who suffers from Down’s syndrome is very different from one who suffers from Tay-Sachs. Therefore, it would seem that we cannot issue a general permission to terminate a pregnancy in a case of Down’s syndrome. However, when the results of the examination are known, the doctor must send the woman (and the hospital administration must issue an order in this regard) to a posek, providing the specifics of the results of the test, and the rabbi who is a posek will pay close attention to the emotional state of the couple in regards to this, and will decide with his halakhic judgment whether to allow the termination of the pregnancy. Only upon receipt of a qualified posek permit may the hospital management agree to do so in its facility. I have emphasized that it is impossible issue a general permission… for according to the halachic sources and arguments that I have detailed and explained in my two previous responsa, in the course of my discussion of termination of pregnancy in the case of Tay-Sachs disease, there is a wide space (a strong basis) to conclude that it is permitted based on those same sources and reasons, even in the case of a fetus with Down’s syndrome. For in the final analysis, as his honor as described in his letter, it is also a very undesirable disease accompanied by physical changes and mental retardation that sometimes requires institutional care and is linked to a shortened life span. These realities have the ability, in many cases, to destroy the emotional/mental state of both the wife and the husband, including the ability to cause them to come down with a serious or not-so-serious illness, and also to destroy the health of the couple’s family life. Let me give an example from a case that came before me in a couple of ultra-Orthodox Jews (from the old yishuv) who had already been born to them – it shouldn’t happen to us – two children who had Down’s syndrome who died a little more than a year after their birth. As a result, the wife was struck with an anxiety attack, and this expressed itself in her refusal to have marital relations with her husband for fear of becoming pregnant and again becoming pregnant with such a fetus. The husband waited a year, then two, and frequently implored his wife to return to a normal marital life, and the woman turned her back to him and remained adamant in her refusal. The situation came to my attention when they were already on the verge of divorce. When I saw what the situation was, I gave the woman permission to undergo the appropriate tests in case she got pregnant. She resumed martial relations with her husband, she became pregnant, she underwent the test, the test showed that everything was fine, and she gave birth to a sound and healthy child. Peace in their house was restored to its proper place, and they continue to live a happy life together. In another case, I was asked by a certain Torah-scholar – scientist, regarding his wife, who was over forty and pregnant, and the doctor advised her to do the test. I tried to influence him that there was no need for an examination and to behave like our forbearers did who had faith in God that everything would turn out alright. He responded to me that from the moment his wife learned from the doctor about the concern (regarding Down’s syndrome) and the possibility to determine this through this recently developed test, she is not able to sleep at night, and she is deeply distressed to the point that he fears for her health. In this way, this knowledge has brought women into a state of “one who adds knowledge adds pain.” Therefore, regarding such cases, and similar ones, it seems that we can certainly base a permission (for termination of pregnancy) one the rulings of the great poskim that we cited in our earlier writings (see Tztitz Eliezer, vol. 9, 13:102, and the previous responsum in this volume). In other words, whether based on the opinion of many poskim who hold that the prohibition against abortion for a Jew is only a rabbinic violation, for a fetus is not considered a life; or based on the opinions of the poskim who believe that it is not even an appurtenance to the sin of murder, but rather an offense like any other offense, add to this the fact that we don’t even violate Shabbat to save such a fetus (according to these opinions) as long as the woman is not in active childbirth; or based on Maharit and the many who are in his camp who permit an abortion whenever it is required for the health of the mother, even when there is no risk to life, and this is even if the prohibition is a Biblical one inasmuch as the fetus does not yet have a presumption of being alive; or based on the opnions that are mentioned in Havot Yair; or based on Yavetz and those in his camp who are of the opinion that there is a basis to be lenient as long as the child has not begun to leave the mother’s womb, even if there is no risk to life of the mother, but only to save her from the fact that the child will cause her great pain; or based on the author of Rav Paalim who is of the opinion that when dealing with these cases, a great need is defined not only in terms of one’s physical health needs, but also in terms of one’s spiritual and emotional needs, in accordance with how I explained and gave backing to this position; or explain and substantiate this; and so on, everything as I wrote and explained with great depth with God’s help in our earlier writings. (D) I would also add that in a case where an abortion is permitted, in addition to the need and obligation to obtain the consent of the woman to terminate the pregnancy (as his honor wrote in his letter, which is included in the standard that you have prepared in this regard), there is also a need and an obligation to receive the husband’s consent, in accordance with the well-known halakha regarding damages when someone causes a woman to miscarry, that such damages are paid to the husband (Shemot 21:22, Baba Kama 42 and 49, Rambam, Hovel u’Mazik 5:1-2, and Hoshen Mishpat 423:1). In conclusion: (a) It is permitted to conduct an amniocentesis for the purpose of making a decision regarding termination of pregnancy due to mental retardation in a case of Down’s syndrome. (b) In the event that the examination shows, with confidence, that the fetus has Down’s syndrome, a permissive ruling must be obtained from a qualified rabbi to perform a termination of pregnancy. (c) An additional consideration to permit such an abortion would be if there was the possibility to terminate the pregnancy through drinking some medicine or through giving an injection (i.e., non-surgical means). (d) In addition to the need to obtain the consent of the woman to terminate the pregnancy, the consent of the husband must also be obtained.With great honor and blessing, Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg |
29. Tzitz Eliezer 14:10 – excerpt on amniocentesis
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר י”ד:ק”א – קטע על אמינוצנטזיס והנה בבעיה הראשונה יש שתי שאלות (א) אם מותר לערוך עצם בדיקה כזאת. (ב) גם אם מותרת מצד עצמה קיימת עדנה שאלה שניה, אם מותרת היא במקרה שהבעיה השניה שנובעת כתוצאה מזה תפתר לאיסורא, כי יוצא שיכשילו את האשה כאשר יתודע לה בבית חולים זה תוצאות הבדיקה, ובית חולים זה ישמע לדין תורה ולא ירצה לבצע הפסקת – הריון, תלך האשה לבית חולים או לרופא אחר אשר יסכימו שלא לשמוע לדין תורה ויבצעו את הפסקת ההריון. | Regarding the first matter (of the permissibility of undergoing an amniocentesis), there are two questions: (a) Whether it is permissible to conduct such an examination? and (b) Even if it is permitted on its own terms, is it permissible in cases where it will lead to a transgressing a prohibition? Because this will lead to causing the woman to stumble (in sin), for when she learns at that hospital the results of the examination, and when the hospital, which follows Torah law, will refuse to terminate the pregnancy, she will go to a different hospital or doctor who will agree to go against Torah law and carry out the termination of pregnancy. Let me explain. The question regarding the intrinsic permissibility of the procedure, is because to do this test – as your honor has explained it to me in our oral conversation – it is necessary to insert a needle through the walls of the woman’s body and into her uterus (and this is done under local anesthesia) and the needle reaches the uterine cavity and draws a quantity of fluid from it … Sometimes it can happen (even if this is rare) that such an examination cause real harm and damage, such as bleeding and the like. And examining the matter, it seems that despite this we can permit the act itself of performing a test … As far as the possibility that this will cause some injury to the woman as a result of this, behold this is it only a doubt (i.e., a small risk), and for this the woman’s consent suffices. For they do not perform such procedures without the woman’s consent to that, The permission to do this is certainly true given that they do not perform such a procedure for the purposes of inflicting injury, but for the sake of benefit. The second question is that, as a result of the examination, the woman will be informed that the defect has been discovered in the fetus, and will arrange for the termination of pregnancy even in the case where the halakhic ruling is to forbid it. As a result of which, by administering the test we are transgressing the prohibition of putting a stumbling block before the blind, This can be an even greater concern if the woman who is undergoing the test is not religious, for in such a case the stumbling block is more real and anticipatable. However, after looking into this matter, it appears that even the concern for this prohibition (of placing a stumbling block) does not exist, For we do not transgress the prohibition of placing a stumbling block before the blind except in cases where it is clear that the other person will transgress as a result of the first person’s actions. But wherever there is room to argue that the first person’s actions will possibly not lead to sin, then he does not transgress placing a stumbling block before the blind… Now, in our case, we have all of these factors (of leniency regarding placing a stumbling block before the blind), and even more than them, For we are not handing the person the forbidden thing, for the test itself is not a violation, as stated above. It is also not clear whether this will even lead to a transgression, for in our case there are many many doubts regarding this. First, perhaps the test will be negative, which is what occurs in the vast majority of cases (the occurrence of Down’s syndrome in this population is only 1-2%), Second, who is to say that the woman will consent afterwards to undergo a termination of pregnancy. Thirdly, perhaps according to the circumstances of the case, she will receive a halakhic ruling permitting her to terminate her pregnancy from a rabbi who is a posek who will permit this according to Torah law… |
30. Tzitz Eliezer 14:10 – use of kabbalistic or theological arguments
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר י”ד:ק”א – קטע על השימוש בטעונים קבליות וכדו’ [מאמר מוסגר: אני מבין שעל פי דברי הקבלה יש להסביר שהכל גזירה מן השמים שיולדו אצל הורים אלה ילודים כאלה, או כעונש להורים, או כתיקון לנשמה חוזרת בעולם עשייה, ולומר על כן (ואני מתאר לי שבודאי ישנם כבר כאלה הטוענים בכזאת) שאין להתחכם נגד זה ולכן אין לעשות שום פעולת הפרעה מהתהליך העתיד להתפתח. אבל כידוע אין לערב דברי קבלה עם ההלכות כדכותב בשו”ת חתם סופר חאו”ח סי’ נ”א, וכן כותבים עוד פוסקים, ולכן כל היכא שיש להתיר ע”פ ההלכה אין מעכב מה שאפשר להסביר ההיפך מזה ע”פ הקבלה, בפרט בדברים שאינם מפורשים גם שם, ועוד זאת אוסיף ואומר, דבכלל יש מקום ליישב זאת גם אפילו דרך הנסתר אשר ינקט הקו של גזירה היא מלפני. והוא עפ”י מה שראיתי בחידושי חתם סופר עה”ת מהדו”ת פרשת משפטים, שמביא שרבים תמהים על דרשתם ז”ל, ורפא ירפא מכאן שניתנה רשות לרופא לרפאות, דמה יועיל להרופא, אם זכיותיו או רחמי ד’ מכריעים שיתרפא למה להרופא, ואם חלילה להיפך מה יועיל הרופא, וכותב הח”ס לתרץ בכזאת, והוא, דידוע דהקב”ה שם חק לטבע, ורצונו שיתנהג העולם ע”פ דרך הטבע שהטביע, והנה חולה אשר ע”פ הרופא עוסק בסמי רפואה אשר טבעם לרפאות אותו מחליו ולגהה מזורו, כדי לשנות הטבע שלא ירפא באלו הסמים הוא מעשה נס, ואין עוונותיו גדולים כ”כ שהקב”ה יעשה נס נגד הטבע, היינו שלא יועילו לו סמי הרפואה, וכן מי שאינו זוכה שיעשה לו רפואה ע”פ נס, מ”מ אם מתנהג ע”פ הטבע לרפואתו יועילו לו זכויותיו ובפרט רחמי שמים שירפא, ועוד כל מה שהוא יותר בדרך הטבע אין צריך זכות כ”כ לזה ולא ינכו לו מזכיותיו עכ”ד הח”ס הנפלאים. וא”כ לפ”ד ח”ס אלה, ועל פיהם, גם בכגון הנידונים שלפנינו יש ג”כ מקום להסביר מעין זה ולומר, שאם כי הנענשים [ההורים והילוד] לא יכולים לזכות לנס שיוסר מהם הסבל ויומתקו הדינים המתוחים עליהם, אבל מכיון שנפתחו משמיא באלף הששי הזה תרעין דחכמתא (כידוע מדברי הזוה”ק בזה) ואפשר עפי”ז להסיר מהם סבלם זה עפ”י דרך הטבע של חכמת הרפואה, והדבר לא מתנגד על פי ההלכה, והוא כאשר מוצאים שע”פ ההלכה מותר לבצע כזאת לצורך גדול, ושדבר ההיתר הוא כשם שמתירים שאר איסורים לצורך חולה וכיוצא בזה, אזי לא צריכים כבר לכל כך זכויות להקלת ולהסרת העונש שנגזר עליהם … באופן שמותר להשתמש איפוא להסרת ענשם זה בדרך טבע זאת, ובשמים יסתפקו (מכיון שזה מותר ע”פ ההלכה) בסבל שכבר סבלו מעצם הריון כזה ובהצער הגדול שמסביב לכך בנגלה ובנסתר, ומכיון שעושין זאת ע”פ הטבע, היינו ע”פ החכמה דיהיב לחכימין להודע על הדבר עוד לפני הלידה יועילו להם כבר זכויותיהם, ובפרט רחמי שמים (כלשונו של הח”ס) שלא יענשו ביותר ממה שכבר נענשו, והוא רחום יכפר עון, ואין להאריך בזה ביותר, ע”כ המאמר המוסגר] | [Parenthetically, I understand that according to the Kabbalah it can be seen that everything is a decree from Heaven that these parents should have such children, either as a punishment for parents, or as a “fixing” (tikkun) of the soul, it is returned to the world of “action” (assiyah). And based on this, there are those who could say (and I imagine that there are already those who actually do say) that it is not our business to try to outsmart this decree, and therefore one should not perform any action that can get in the way of the process which is unfolding. But, as is well known, one should not bring Kabbalah into Halakhah. As is written in Responsa Hatam Sofer, OH 51. Other poskim write similarly. Therefore, wherever there is a basis for permitting a certain action based on the Halakha, a counter-explanation of the situation based on Kabbalah should not act as any obstacle to performing the halakhically-permitted action, especially in cases where this kabbalistic explanation is not explicitly stated in kabbalistic sources. I will also add that in general there is a way to reconcile (the decision to take such an action) with a kabbalistic approach which takes the perspective that “it is a decree that has issued from Me (and you may not question it).” This is based on what I saw in Hidushei Hatam Sofer of the Torah, (Tinyana) [Riviai], Parashat Mishpatim. Hatam Sofer states that “There are many who wonder about the Rabbis’ interpretation of “and he shall surely be healed,” (Ex. 21:9) that “from this you can derive that a doctor was given permission to heal.” (Berakhot 60a). People ask: what good does a doctor do? If a person’s merits or God’s mercy determine that the sick person will be cured, who needs the doctors? And if, Heaven forbid, the opposite is the case, then again, what good will the doctor do? To answer this, Hatam Sofer writes along the following lines. It is known that God created the laws of Nature, and it is His desire that the world should follow these laws of Nature. Now, consider a patient who, based on the doctor’s instructions, takes drugs which, according to the laws of the physical world, have the ability to heal and cure him, To alter the nature of such drugs so that they do not heal the person would be a miraculous act, and this person’s sins are not so great that God should perform a miracle to go against the laws of Nature and to prevent these drugs from being effective. Similarly, if someone does not merit that he should be healed via a miracle, nevertheless if he acts according to the laws of the natural world to heal himself, here his merits, and in particular God’s mercy, can help him to be cured. Moreover, as long as someone is operating according to the laws of nature, there is not such a need for his merits, and his reward for his good deeds will not be deducted from as a result of his recovering from his illness.” These are the amazing words of Hatam Sofer. Therefore, according to these words of Hatam Sofer, one can explain the cases we are dealing with in a similar matter. We can say that if those who are “being punished” [the parents and the newborn] do not merit that a miracle should remove this suffering from them, and that the judgments that have been issues against them will be mitigated[, they can themselves, following the laws of the natural world, act to alleviate their suffering]. In this sixth millennium (from Creation) the gates of wisdom have been opened (as is known from the Zohar), we now have the ability to save them from their suffering, by following the laws of nature and the wisdom of medicine. When, in addition, doing such is not in opposition to halakha – because we find that according to halakha it is permissible to undergo a termination of pregnancy in cases of great need, and this permissive ruling is no different than that way we make permit other prohibitions in the case of a sick person and the like – then [there is a way for them to alleviate their suffering and] there is not such a need for a person’s merits to help alleviate and remove the punishment that was decreed against them… In this way it is permissible to remove the punishment against them through natural means, and Heaven will be satisfied (because it is permissible according to the halakhah) with the suffering that they already suffered from a pregnancy such as this in itself, and from the great sorrow (or “anguish”) that is attendant with it, both visible and not visible. Because they do so according to nature, that is, by following the wisdom that has been given to wise people to find a way to discover this condition before birth, then their merits, and in particular God’s mercy, will help them (to use the phrase of Hatam Sofer), that they will . , especially the mercy of heaven (in the language of the High Court of Justice) that they will not be punished any more than they have already been punished. And the One who is compassionate will atone for sin. There is no need to go on about this at any more length.] |
31. Iggrot Moshe, Choshen Mishpat, 2:69
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, 1895-1986, was the leading halachic authority of American Jewry.
שו”ת אגרות משה חושן משפט ב:סט אסרו”ח סוכות תשל”ז…. הנה בדבר הריגת עובר במעי אמו בישראל…. וברמב”ם פ”א מהלכות רוצח ה”ט מפורש עוד יותר דהריגת עובר הוא רציחה ממש… ולכן לדינא… איכא איסור רציחה מלא תרצח גם על עובר ורק שפטור ההורגו ממיתה, … ומטעם זה הוריתי שאף שהרופאים אומרים שיש חשש שמא תמות האם כשלא יהרגו את העובר, אף שלענין חלול שבת וכל האיסורין היו מחללין והיו עוברין במדת חשש שאמרו דהא גם בשביל ספק קטן וס”ס מחללין, מ”מ להרוג את העובר יהיה אסור עד שתהיה האומדנא להרופאים גדולה קרוב לודאי שתמות האם…. וגם לענין אונס אם רשאי הרופא לעבור ולא ליהרג… שא”כ יש לו להיות בדין יהרג ואל יעבור…ולכן צ”ע לדינא אם איכא בזה דיהרג ולא יעבור או לא… כתבתי כל זה לענין הפרצה הגדולה בעולם שהמלכיות דהרבה מדינות התירו להרוג עוברים ובתוכם גם ראשי המדינה במדינת ישראל וכבר נהרגו עוברים לאין מספר שבזה”ז הא עוד יש צורך לעשות סיג לתורה, וכ”ש שלא לעשות קולות באיסור רציחה החמור ביותר, שלכן נשתוממתי בראותי תשובה מחכם אחד בא”י הנכתב למנהל ביה”ח שערי צדק ונדפס בחוברת אסיא י”ג המתיר הולדות שע”י בחינות הרופאים כשהוא עובר יותר מג”ח שהעובר הוא במחלת תיי – סקס להפילו, ומצד זה הקדים שעצם הריגת העוברים הוא להרבה פוסקים רק מדרבנן… וברור ופשוט כדכתבתי הלכה הברורה ע”פ רבותינו הראשונים המפרשים והפוסקים ממש שאסור בדין רציחה ממש כל עובר בין כשר בין ממזר בין סתם עוברים ובין הידועים לחולי תיי – סקס שכולן אסורין מדינא ממש, ואין לטעות ולסמוך על תשובת חכם זה ושרי ליה מריה בזה הכו”ח לכבוד התורה ודין האמת. | Day after Sukkot. 1976.
|
A View from Reform Judaism
32. R. Alvin Reises, “Reform Judaism, Bioethics and Abortion,” Journal of Reform Judaism, 1990
Since every Reform Jew possesses an ultimate moral right to autonomy, each possesses the authority to determine for her/himself what she/he believes true and valid. This includes the right to decide for her/himself the standard to use in determining if an entity is human. Even so, an objective standard for humanness that is accepted by the generality of humankind would be difficult for a Reformer to deny although he/she would have the right to do so… From the testimony of the religious, philosophic, and scientific communities of the world viewed as a whole, it is evident that there is no generally accepted objective standard for determining whether a fetus is a human being or part of the mother in which it exists. There exist only a mélange of subjective standards varying from one religionist to another, from one philosopher to another, and from one scientist to another. Consequently, since there is no objective standard for determining humanness, no impediment exists to deter the Reform Jew from deciding for her/himself whether a fetus is a human being or part of the female in which it exists… According to Reform principles, as stated above, every person owns his/her own body, with the ultimate right, consequently, to determine what that body shall do and experience. This being the case, it is a Reform presumption that whatever exists within the confines of a person’s body and is physically connected to it is part of that body, and therefore entirely under the authority of the person whose body it is. If some entity, a person or organization of persons, therefore, whishes to exercise authority over a fetus in a woman’s body, the entity must prove convincingly either that the fetus is a person and not part of that body or that is possesses a moral right to authority over the woman’s body superior to that of the woman whose body it is. No entity – state, religious institution or individual – has taken even beginning steps to demonstrate objectively that a fetus is a person or that the entity possesses a moral right to override a woman’s authority over her own body. |
33. Dr. Avraham Steinberg, The Beginning of Life – Jewish Perspectives, 2005.
PRE-IMPLANTATION EMBRYO
|
שו”ת ציץ אליעזר, כ:ב ח”י טבת תשנ”ג. עובדא הוה באשה אחת שהרתה רביעיה, אחרי בדיקות רפואיות החליטו הרופאים שמן ההכרח להמית עובר אחד דאזי יוולדו שלשת הנותרים חיים, אחרת יוולדו כולם מתים, ונשאלתי מבעלה שהוא ת”ח אם מותר זאת על פי דין להמית אחד מהם כדי שהאחים ישארו בחיים ואם זה לא דומה לההלכה הנפסקה ברמב”ם בפ”ה מה’ יסודי התורה הלכה ה’ דאם אמרו להם עכו”ם תנו לנו אחד מכם ונהרגהו ואם לאו נהרוג כולכם יהרגו כולם ואל ימסרו להם נפש אחת מישראל… ועל האמור שההורג את העובר אין שם רוצח אליו ושלא נכלל בהג’ עבירות שנאמר בהם יהרג ואל יעבור שאחד מהם שפ”ד, אין מי שחולק, ונחלקו רק איזה עבירת לאו יש בזה, אי משום לאו דחבלה, או משום השחתת זרע, וכיוצא בזה, אבל אין זה אפילו בגדר של אביזרייהו דשפ”ד, ואמבוהא דספרי סוברים שאינו אלא מדרבנן, ומהם מכנים זאת רק בשם קצת איסור… לאור כל האמור נלפענ”ד להלכה בנידון שאלתנו שמותר להמית עובר אחד כדי להציל עי”כ חיי יתר שלשת העוברין אשר כל אחד מהם הוא בבחיה על רודף את משנהו | 1993.
|
35. Rav Yitzhak Zilberstein: “The Evaluation of the Pre-embryo Before Implantation for Prevention of Defective Embryos and Gender Determination,” Assia, Iyar 5752
And since most great authorities hold that there is no law of loss of life with regard to abortions, it is clear that it is possible to rule leniently in this case and in the matter under discussion, where the questioner wrote that even if the fetuses survived, they’d be born with serious mental and physical defects, it’s clear that one should follow the lenient ruling and say that it is permissible to kill some of the fetuses so that the remaining ones will be born healthy. |
All of the content in The Lindenbaum Center for Halakhic Studies is released with a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. It is open for reuse with the following attribution: "Authored by [name of author] from The Lindenbaum Center for Halakhic Studies at YCT.