Should it be announced in the synagogue before the blowing of shofar that it is forbidden to speak?
On each day of Rosh HaShanah the shofar is blown no fewer than one hundred times in synagogue. The first thirty blasts before the mussaf service are known as tekiot d’meyushav, while the last seventy blasts blown during and after mussaf are known as tekiot d’meumad. Even though one fulfills the biblical mitzvah of shofar with the tekiot d’meyushav, it is a rabbinic enactment to hear all one hundred blasts. Because of this, many poskim argue that one must be careful not to do any activities that would be considered a halakhic interruption (hefsek) until the conclusion of tekiot d’meyushav. As a result, one would be allowed sing, pray, and even go to the bathroom during this time if they so needed, but they would be prohibited from speaking about matters unrelated to the prayers. However, because the mussaf service is so long on Rosh HaShanah, it is often the case that people will begin to talk, thereby violating the prohibition.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe Orech Chaim 2:36) was asked about this problem by a synagogue rabbi who wanted to know whether it was appropriate to announce to the congregation that it is forbidden to speak until the conclusion of the mussaf service. Though he wanted his congregants to follow the proper halakhic practice, he was concerned they would not listen to him and talk anyway. In doing so, his prior warning would make them intentional sinners rather than just unintentional sinners who didn’t know that talking was prohibited during this time. Consequently, he would be violating the Talmudic imperative that “it is better that they should be unintentional sinners than intentional sinners” (See Shabbat 148b).
The question of how to best educate a community about correct halakhic practice is difficult for every rabbi, a point that Rav Moshe deeply understands. On the one hand, it is problematic to tell people to correct their religious practice if they won’t, in fact, listen. On the other hand, the fear that people won’t listen can often cause a rabbi never to speak out and try to push people towards correct practice. Furthermore, even though not all of the congregation may listen, there may very well be some who will. Should they not be told the proper halakha simply because others might refuse to follow it?
In weighing all of this, Rav Moshe notes that the practice of not speaking until the end of tekiot d’meumad may be more of a chumra. But even with this, the problem still remains. If it is only a chumra, perhaps it is better to make the announcement because those who choose to speak will only be violating a relatively minor prohibition. However, one could also argue that they will be doing so intentionally, and according to the Talmud, one deserves punishment for an intentional act one believes to be forbidden even if it turns out in the end not to be. Perhaps then it is better not to make the announcement.
Rav Moshe realizes that he can’t easily resolve these questions and concludes that if there is a significant chance some people present might listen, then one should make the announcement. In the end, these kinds of decisions are often a judgement call, but they require careful consideration of all sides. If one never instructs others about proper halakhic practice, then one closes off the possibility of their spiritual growth. Yet, at the same time, a rabbi must weigh the details of the situation to truly be certain that there is a real chance that someone will listen.
| שו”ת אגרות משה אורח חיים חלק ב סימן לו אם יש להכריז קודם תקיעות שאסור להפסיק בדבור עד גמר דמעומד בביהכ”נ שלא יקבלו. ובדבר להכריז קודם תקיעות שאסור להפסיק בדבור עד אחר תקיעות דמעומד בבית הכנסת שמתפללים הרבה אנשים פשוטים שידוע שלא ישמעו לההכרזה ויפסיקו שאחד אמר שיותר טוב שלא יכריזו כדי שיהיו שוגגין ולא מזידין, ומע”כ טען דכי בשביל חשש זה לא ילמדו להעולם שום דינים שנאמר בהו מוטב שיהיו שוגגים. הנה הא דבשביל מוטב שיהיו שוגגין א”צ לומר להו הוא דוקא בידוע בודאי שלא יקבלו כדאיתא בתוס’ ב”ב דף ס’ וברא”ש ביצה דף ל’, ולדידהו אין לומר ולא קשה איך נמנע מללמד להם דכיון שודאי לא יקיימו אף שכשידעו שאסור הרי אין תועלת מהלמוד להם, אבל כשלא ברור שלא יקבלו ודאי מחוייבים למחות בהם וכ”ש ללמדם שלא בשעת מעשה. ונראה פשוט שכשבא אדם ללמוד ודאי מלמדין לו כל דבר כפי הדין אף בברור שלא יקבלו ואין להורות שלא כדין בשביל זה שלא יקיימו, ורק כשאין שואלים ממנו אין לנו בעצמנו לומר שזהו רק מדין מחאה וליכא באופן זה מטעם שיהיו שוגגין ולא מזידים. וכן נראה פשוט שאם יש שם גם מי שיקבלו צריך לומר להם שאסור אף שידוע שאיזה מהם לא יקבלו ויהיו מזידין, דבשביל קלקול אלו שיעברו במזיד ויענשו כמזיד אין לקלקל לאלו שיקבלו שהרי כשלא יודיעום יעברו בשוגג שהוא ג”כ איסור וקלקול. ולכן בביהכ”נ שאפשר יש גם אלו שאין יודעין שאסור להפסיק ויעברו בשוגג וכשיכריזו שאסור להפסיק יקבלו ולא יפסיקו צריך להכריז, אם אין יכולים להודיע להספק מקבלים ביחוד. ואם ידוע שאין שם מי שיקבל, או שיכולים להודיע להספק מקבלים ביחוד אין להכריז. וקצת יש להסתפק בדין זה דאסור להפסיק גם אחר תקיעות דמיושב עד שיגמור תקיעות דמעומד שלא ברור האיסור דהר”ן בשם בעה”מ סוף ר”ה הקשה ע”ז דמידי דהוה אמדבר באמצע הסעודה והובא בט”ז סימן תקצ”ב סק”ב והתירוצים דחוקים והר”ן מסיק דרק משום דהביא זה הרי”ף בשם הריש מתיבתא צריך ליזהר בזה עיין שם, ונמצא שאף אם במזיד יפסיק בדבור לא יעבור באיסור ממש אפשר ליכא בזה משום מוטב שיהיו שוגגים וצריך להכריז. או אדרבה כשיכריזו שאסור ויעבור יהיה עובר יותר מצד מחשבתו שהוא יסבור שהוא איסור ממש, שיש ע”ז עונש אף שבעצם אינו איסור ממש כדדריש ר”ע בקידושין דף פ”א וכשלא יכריזו הרי יהיה רק שוגג בדבר שהוא רק חומרא בעלמא שאולי לא יענש ע”ז ואין להכריז, ואין בידי לע”ע הכרעה בספק זה. ולכן יש לעשות כדלעיל שאם אפשר שיקבלו איזה מהשומעין צריך להכריז שאסור להפסיק ואם ידוע שכל האין יודעין הדין לא יקבלו אין להכריז. ידידו מברכו בחג שמח, משה פיינשטיין. | Should it be announced in the synagogue before the blowing of shofar that it is forbidden to speak and therefore interrupt until the conclusion of blowing the shofar at the end of mussaf if it [the announcement] will not be followed? If it is known that there are many unlearned people praying in the synagogue who will not heed the announcement and will interrupt by talking, it could be said that it is better not to make the announcement so that they will be unintentional sinners rather than intentional sinners. However, the questioner claims that this concern would make it so that one would never teach any rules of halakha, for it could always be said, “better they are unintentional sinners.” The concern “better they are unintentional sinners” only applies if it is known with certainty that they will not listen as is found in Tosafot (Bava Batra 60) and Rosh (Beitzach 3). According to their position, one would only be prevented from instructing another if one was certain they will not accept it even if they know it is forbidden, for there would be no benefit from their learning. However, when it is unclear if they will follow it, one is certainly obligated to rebuke them and, all the more so, teach them [the proper practice] at the appropriate time. It appears obvious that when a person comes to learn, one should teach them everything according to the law, even if one is certain they won’t accept it. One shouldn’t teach the halakha improperly because the listener won’t accept it. It is only if one isn’t asked that the responsibility to instruct the halakha is understood as a rebuke and one would not be obligated to do so [to rebuke] in a case of “better they are unintentional sinners.” It appears obvious that if there are some [in the congregation] who would follow the instruction, it must be stated on their behalf that it is prohibited [to speak] even if it is known that others will not listen and will become intentional sinners. Because those who will transgress intentionally and therefore deserve to be punished as intentional sinners act destructively, should we then allow those who would follow the instruction to also be damaged? Even when they don’t know [the proper practice] they still transgress just unintentionally, which is also prohibited and damaging. Therefore, in a synagogue where it is also possible that those who do not know its prohibited to interrupt and speak and will therefore unintentionally transgress [ when they do so] but if it was announced that it is forbidden to interrupt and speak, they would listen and not do it, one must make the announcement. This [must be done] if one cannot inform those who might listen separately from those who will not. If it is clear that no one will listen or one can inform directly those who might listen, one should not make the announcement. One can question the ruling that it is prohibited to interrupt and speak until from the tekiot d’meyushav until after the tekiot d’meumad. It is not clearly forbidden for Ran brings down in the name of Baal Maor (End of Rosh HaShanah) that this [speaking during mussaf] should be no different than speaking in the middle of a meal [after the beracha is recited over the food and one begins to eat]. This difficulty is brought in Taz (Orech Chaim 592:2) and the solutions he offers there to resolve it are forced. Ran concludes that only because Rif cited this [practice of not speaking during mussaf] in the name of the resh metivta that one should be careful about it. From this, it can be determined that even those who intentionally interrupt by speaking do not transgress a real prohibition, and it is possible that the rule of “it is better that they be unintentional sinners” does not even apply [in this case] and therefore, one should make the announcement not to speak. Or, perhaps the opposite is true. When one announces that it is prohibited and they [choose to] transgress, it will be in their minds as if they intentionally violated an explicit prohibition. For this, there is a punishment even though the act is not technically prohibited, as explained by Rabbi Akiva (Kiddushin 81). When it is not announced, those who speak will only be unintentional sinners regarding an extra stringency and perhaps would not be punished for violating it. Therefore one should not make the announcement. I don’t have the ability to resolve this uncertainty. Therefore, one should do as outlined above. If it is possible that there are those [in the congregation] who will follow the instruction, one should announce that it is prohibited to interrupt by speaking. But if it is known that they will not follow the instruction, one should not make the announcement.
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Rabbi Zachary Truboff ('10) is the coordinator of the International Beit Din Institute, which seeks to educate rabbis about halakhic solutions to the agunah problem. His writings on contemporary Jewish thought and Zionism have appeared in the Lehrhaus, Arutz Sheva, Akdamot, and Zerufim. His first book, Torah Goes Forth From Zion: Essays on the Thought of Rav Kook and Rav Shagar, will appear in the coming year. Before making aliyah, he served for nearly a decade as the rabbi of Cedar Sinai Synagogue in Cleveland. Under his leadership the synagogue grew substantially and became known for its inclusive community and innovative programing. In 2015, he was chosen by the Cleveland Jewish News as one of the 18 Difference Makers, a select group honored for their contributions to Jewish communal life in Northeast Ohio. He has taught in a variety of adult education settings such as the Wexner Heritage Program, the Torat Tzion Kollel, and the Hartman Institute. . He received semikha from Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and Yeshivat Chovevei Torah. He and wife, Jen, live in Jerusalem with the four children Nahum, Elihai, Shaiya, and Orya.
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